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 Keith Ansell Pearson
 Thirty years after its publication in France, Klossowski's Vicious Circle has
 been published in English in a highly readable translation by Daniel W.
 Smith. Klossowski's text is often compared in stature to such eventful read
 ings as Martin Heidegger's two-volume study and Gilles Deleuze's Nietzsche
 and Philosophy. Such comparisons, however, miss the essential incompa
 rable character of Klossowski's text. It may well be the most extraordinary
 text on Nietzsche ever composed, as well as one of the most disconcerting
 and disquieting. It has a certain communion with Bataille's writings, includ
 ing his own text on Nietzsche, but on account of its trenchant insights, ex
 acting rigour, and exquisite precision, it goes far beyond anything in Bataille's
 reading. It is not a book that one can readily recommend as an essential text
 that anyone concerned with Nietzsche must read, simply because it is a
 quite terrifying reading of Nietzsche. At the end of it, the reader, or should I
 say this reader, experiences utter vertigo.
 Klossowski is a truly great writer and reader. His knowledge of
 Nietzsche's texts, including the Nachlass fragments from the 1880s, as well
 as rare material from Nietzsche's schooldays at Schulpforta (including a
 horror story called "Euphorion"), is impressive. Klossowski has a rare un
 derstanding of the details of Nietzsche's thinking and of what is truly at
 stake in it. His book takes us further into the treacherous depths of Nietzsche's
 thought than any other study I know. In many ways, its readers may still lie
 in the future. The danger with this book is that it will be read too cavalierly
 in terms of the alleged fashionable tropes of deconstruction or
 poststructuralism, such as the incompleteness of meaning, the infinite play
 of interpretation, and so on. This would be a great shame since such institu
 tionalised readings miss its crucial dimension and fail to engage with what
 makes this such a convincing and remarkable text, namely, that it has pen
 etrated the strange depths of Nietzsche's thought and shows what this amounts
 to, not only for his critique of language and meaning, but for his engagement
 with "life" in terms of both a theory of knowledge and a theory of evolution.
 For Klossowski, Nietzsche is a thinker of the near and distant future, a
 future, he says, which has now become our everyday reality. However, eve
 rything depends on knowing how we ought to read Nietzsche. Klossowski is
 ingenious in his response. He argues throughout the book that Nietzsche's
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 key thought-experiments are simulacra which unfold in terms of the simula
 tion of a "conspiracy." The Nietzschean conspiracy is not, of course, that of
 a class, but of an isolated individual "who uses the means of this class not
 only against his own class, but also against the existing forms of the human
 species as a whole" (xv). The second key component of the reading is the
 claim that Nietzsche's thought revolves around delirium as its axis and,
 furthermore, that it is incredibly lucid on this issue (Klossowski 's unfolding
 of the drama of Nietzsche's last days in Turin in his final chapter makes for
 some truly chilling and remarkable reading since it demonstrates in a way
 that is both convincing and unnerving that there was something completely
 lucid about Nietzsche's descent into muteness and madness). Klossowski
 insists that, conceived in terms of a project of delirium, Nietzsche's thought
 cannot simply be labelled "pathological." It is far too knowing about itself
 for this and lucid to the extreme. Nietzsche produces a body of work that
 challenges both the principle of identity (the authority of language, of the
 code, of the institution) and the reality principle (consciousness, the subject,
 the ego, substance, etc.). His new demonstration?"required by institutional
 language for the teaching of reality"?takes the form of the movements of a
 "declarative mood." Ultimately this contagious mood, or what Klossowski
 calls the "tonality of the soul," supplants the demonstration and b?th thought
 and life become "mute." The limits of the principles of identity and reality
 are inevitably and inexorably reached.
 By the end of the introduction, we have in place a theme that will be
 come one of the text's most important features: the opposition between "cul
 ture" (society, language, and consciousness), which is based on the inten
 tion to teach and learn, and the tonality of the soul, which operates on the
 level of intensities that can be neither taught nor learnt. This opposition
 strikes me as a dramatic transposition into the heart of Nietzsche's darkness
 of the essential thematic of Henri Bergson's first published text, Time and
 Free Will. This text begins with the phenomenon of intensity and intensive
 magnitudes, moves on to a conception of duration as a virtual multiplicity,
 and then arrives at a twofold conception of the "self," the "superficial" self
 of language and society and the "deep-seated" self of duration and intensity.
 Klossowski was a keen reader of Heidegger (whose two volumes on
 Nietzsche he translated into French in 1971). However, the "authenticity"
 at stake in his reading of Nietzsche is not that of historicality and resolution,
 but rather that of intensity and the dissolution of both identity and reality.
 The opening chapter, entitled "The Combat against Culture," presents
 Nietzsche as a thinker "beyond the human condition," that is, one who chal
 lenges and puts to the test the knowledge, practices, customs, and habits that
 make up Western culture (6). In response to the "levelling powers of gre
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 garious thought," Nietzsche champions the alternative "erectile power of
 particular cases." Since morality is by definition the domain of gregarious
 ness, it is viewed as the "principal 'metaphysical virus' of thought and sci
 ence" (6).
 In chapter 2, "The Valetudinary States at the Origin of a Semiotic of
 Impulses," Klossowski commences his presentation of eternal return and its.
 essential paradoxical nature as a doctrine that cannot be taught since it is an
 experience that is not bound up with either language or social communica
 tion. The actual and complex nature of its experience is the focus of chapter
 3. Chapters 4-6 are devoted to bringing out and examining the various as
 pects of the doctrine, including the scientific (chapter 5) and the political
 (chapter 6). It is clear that for Klossowski the most crucial dimension of the
 thought-experiment is to be found in the descriptions Nietzsche gave his
 Sils experience in August 1881 "6000 feet beyond man and time."
 Klossowski accords a tremendous privilege to this event in Nietzsche's life
 since it provides access, he holds, to the tonality of the soul and the intensities
 of lived experience that are beyond knowledge and outside communication.
 However, because everything that is at stake in Nietzsche is made depend
 ent on this momentous experience in Klossowski's reading, it also becomes
 the vulnerable point in that reading.
 Klossowski approaches the eternal return in terms of asking the ques
 tion, "What kind of invention does it provide?" The invention is a deeply
 paradoxical one, not only because it is attempting to respond to the deepest
 problems of "life," but also because it is doing so through the "impossible"
 mediums of language, pedagogy, culture, and such. Adherence to the non
 sense of life and belief in return entails an "impracticable lucidity" (53).
 The project is not one of renouncing language, intentions, or even willing,
 but rather one of evaluating them "in a different manner than we have hith
 erto evaluated them?namely, as subject to the 'law' of the vicious Circle"
 (53). The law of this circle has a specific non-sense to it, which is to do with
 the liquidation of meaning and goal. This is how Klossowski brings together
 the thought-experiments of the later Nietzsche:
 The "overman" becomes the name of the subject of the will to power, both
 the meaning and the goal of the Eternal Return. The will to power is only
 a humanized term for the soul of the Vicious Circle, whereas the latter is a
 pure intensity without intention. On the other hand, the Vicious Circle, as
 Eternal Return, is presented as a chain of existences that forms the indi
 viduality of the doctrine's adherent, who knows that he has pre-existed
 otherwise than he now exists, and that he will yet exist differently, from
 "one eternity to another." (70)
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 This articulation of the doctrine reveals both the enormous influence of
 Bataille on Klossowski 's configuration (or disfiguration) and gives expres
 sion to his own unique conception of a new fatalism, that of fortuity.1 This
 can be understood in terms of a "renewed version of metempsychosis," in
 which the "richness of a single existence" resides in infinite possibilities of
 becoming-other; it resides in "affective potential" (71 ). Within the economy
 of the vicious circle, one fortuitous soul is dissolved in order to give way to
 another equally fortuitous soul. The experience of return is one of intensity,
 then, which "emits of a series of infinite vibrations of being" (72). The
 promise of this new teaching is the promise of a new creature coming into
 being, one that has gone beyond the established gregarious conditions of
 life and which no longer lives according to the "durable fixity of species"
 (139).
 Nietzsche's body and organism became, according to Klossowski, the
 battleground upon which the struggle of life seeking to overcome itself to
 higher levels of intensity and energy was played out. He interprets the col
 lapse in Turin in terms of disproportion between "the time of the pathos"
 and the "time of the organism." This gives rise to an exchange or transac
 tion in which the organism and the body "are the price of the pathos." In
 other words, the law of eternal return required "the destruction of the very
 organ that had disclosed it: namely, Nietzsche's brain" (221).
 Klossowski is decisive in his choice of reading the eternal return in
 terms of what I would designate as a "superior existentialism" (the authen
 ticity of self-dissolution) and disregarding its cosmological aspects. He en
 dorses Lou Salome's judgement that the search for a scientific foundation to
 the doctrine is an error, though he does not give an account of his reasons for
 adhering to this now widespread view. He does entertain, with Salome, the
 highly speculative claim that the reason why Nietzsche himself was so keen
 to find proof of his doctrine in a cosmology was because this would help him
 in the task of dissuading himself of a delirious intelligence. This claim rests
 on a highly selective and tendentious reading of the intellectual trajectory of
 Nietzsche's thought and disregards the cosmology Nietzsche worked on and
 outlined in the 1880s (a decade that witnesses Poincare's efforts to establish
 a recurrence theorem in science, to which Klossowski makes no reference).
 It is not that Klossowski ignores completely the relation between
 Nietzsche and science; on the contrary, he has some stimulating things to
 say about it. His stance on this issue is to argue that Nietzsche's researches
 into the biological and physiological sciences were only ever motivated by
 the needs of his own personal singularity or "particular case." Thus, Nietzsche
 wanted "to find a mode of behaviour, in the organic and inorganic world,
 that was analogous to his own valetudinary state .. . based on this mode of
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 behaviour, to find the arguments and resources that would allow him to re
 create himself, beyond his own self (32). Science is an ambiguous ally in
 Nietzsche's inhuman project. On the one hand, it explores life and the uni
 verse without being concerned about the consequences for human behav
 iour with regard to the reality principle. On the other hand, it is "essentially
 an institutional principle dictated by reasons of security for the (gregarious)
 continuity of existence" (134). Klossowski argues that Nietzsche projects
 the "conspiracy" of his teaching of the vicious circle against the "external
 conspiracy ... of the science and morality of institutions." It is in this con
 text that we can best appreciate the meaning of Nietzsche positioning him
 self "contra Darwin": "The selection expounded by Darwin coincides per
 fectly with bourgeois morality." Natural selection "conspires with
 gragariousness by presenting mediocre beings as strong, rich and powerful
 beings" (169). Klossowski is right to make Nietzsche's engagement with
 Darwinism central to a reading of his texts, but I am not convinced that he
 has got to grips with either the full complexity of Nietzsche's response to
 Darwin or the challenge Darwinism presents to any Nietzschean-inspired
 thinking of life. Nietzsche's thinking?notably the doctrine of will to power?
 reaches an impasse once it realizes that "Darwinism is correct": "[T]he will
 to power in which I recognize the ultimate character and ground of all change
 provides us with the reason why selection is not in favour of the exceptions
 and lucky strokes" {WP 685). Now if the triumph of reactive values is not
 "antibiological," as Nietzsche himself tells us, then what becomes of the
 doctrine of will to power? If it ends up concurring with Darwinism, then is
 the doctrine of return Nietzsche's attempt to find a way out of this impasse?
 If these are the right kind of questions to pose, then the truly key issue be
 comes that of the adequacy of eternal return as a response to biological and
 cultural evolution. It is inadequate to simply assert, as Klossowksi does,
 that Nietzsche equated Darwinism with bourgeois morality. On the con
 trary, for Nietzsche, Darwin's theory of evolution is the correct one?even
 at the level of will to power. This is why he tells us that his engagement
 takes place around a "problem of economics." In short, Nietzsche seeks to
 identify within evolution a different energetics, one in which "'Duration' as
 such has no value" {WP 864). In neither case, then, that of Darwinism or
 Nietzscheanism, are we dealing simply with a problem of morality; rather,
 we are dealing with a problem of economics and energetics.
 The intelligence of this text on the vicious circle demands an exact en
 gagement. For me the most important problem of Klossowski's reading re
 volves around the manner in which it unknowingly takes over the central
 antinomy of Bergson's early text and produces through its lens an interpre
 tation of the eternal return as the paradoxical doctrine of muteness par ex
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 cellence. He refuses to work through the antinomy and instead sets it up a
 kind of a priori antagonism between intensity and institution.
 Ultimately, for Klossowski, Nietzsche is not someone who thinks be
 yond the human condition. Rather, he is indeed "one of those machines who
 explode" and who feels the dissolution of all identity and reality, and so is,
 in some quasi-mystical sense, beyond truth and knowledge, beyond meta
 physics and science. This explains why he spends so little time on Nietzsche's
 attempts to come up with some cosmological proof of the doctrine. For
 Klossowski, this is not because the thought is ethical, but because both the
 ethical and cosmological renditions of the thought-experiment miss the es
 sential point of it, chiefly, that it is outside of thought altogether. All the
 stress is placed on the ecstasy and the agony of the 1881 summit experience
 in Sils-Maria. For Klossowski, this is the decisive turn in Nietzsche's lived
 experience. His subsequent attempts to work out the meaning of what had
 happened to him are doomed attempts to communicate what is beyond com
 munication and to make sense of an irreducible non-sense.
 The disjunction between life and knowledge on which so much of his
 staging of the case of Nietzsche rests proves a fateful, and perhaps ulti
 mately fatal, choice for Klossowski to make since it condemns Nietzsche to
 isolation and solitude as his irrevocable destiny, playing the role of a simu
 lator of thought, the supreme conspirator-actor in Klossowski's stage pro
 duction of the filthy lessons of philosophy, one who teaches the unteachable,
 thinks the unthinkable, and attempts to unthink thought?and then falls,
 unsurprisingly, into complete (and unsimulated?) muteness and madness.
 Deparment of Philosophy
 University of Warwick
 pyrbh@snow. csv. Warwick, ac. uk
 Note
 1. For Bataille on return as a "mode of drama" that "unmotivates the moment and
 frees life of ends," see his On Nietzsche, trans. B. Boone (London: Athlone Press, 1992),
 preface, xxxiii.
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